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Abstract 
In this article I articulate a neo-pragmatist theory of human rights by drawing and 
expanding upon the American classical pragmatism of G.H. Mead. I characterize this 
neo-pragmatist theory of rights by its anti-foundationalist, relational, fictive, and 
constitutive nature. I begin by providing a reconstruction of Mead’s social pragmatist 
approach to rights, a contribution systematically ignored by contemporary sociologists 
of rights. Next I detail the cost of this disciplinary oblivion by examining how much 
neo-pragmatism, critical theory, and legal consciousness studies have meanwhile 
gained by engaging with Mead’s work on rights. Finally, I discuss the contributions of 
this historical-theoretical exercise to the rapidly growing sociology of rights. I show 
that by supplementing my neo-Meadian approach with a recent interpretation of 
Hobbes’s fictional theory of politics, there appear substantive gains in the empirical 
study of the origins, consequences, meaning, and denial of rights. 
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Human Rights and Sociology 
 
Human rights and sociology make strange bedfellows. The universal and 
individualistic way human rights are typically defined – as entitlements, guarantees 
and liberties that all individual human beings possess by virtue of being human – sits 
uncomfortably with the broadly shared sensitivity to historical contingency and social 
constructionism exhibited by most contemporary sociologists. Yet sociologists have 
never been so challenged to theorize human rights as in our time. Ours is the “age of 
rights”, an historical period in whose Zeitgeist human rights perform important social 
functions, from supporting critical positions vis-à-vis capitalism to providing the basis 
for claims to recognition of neglected particularities. This confronts sociologists with 
a dilemma. How to study rights, an object of inquiry whose growing social relevance 
is only matched by its unremitting elusiveness to sociology’s conventional analytical 
lenses? This is the central question I seek to answer in this paper. 
 
This paper is about a social theory of rights. It aims to provide sociologists with an 
alternative to liberal political theory, which conceives of rights as individualistic, a 
priori, adversarial, and as having an essence. As a result, the theory proposed here 
questions the dichotomy between natural and citizenship rights, closely associated 
with liberal political thinking. Also, the social theory I develop in this paper is 
intended to provide an alternative to the dominant sociological approaches to rights, 
whose foundationalism, I argue, impairs their heuristic value. My strategy to 
destabilize both liberal and foundationalist accounts of rights draws on resources from 
a widely ignored social theoretical tradition in this regard – classical American 
pragmatism, especially as formulated by George Herbert Mead (1863-1931). My aim 
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is to develop a pragmatist social theoretical explanation of how rights were imagined, 
conquered, implemented, and sometimes denied in concrete historical situations – and 
how, as emergents of these social processes, they simultaneously enable and 
constrain, i.e., they help constitute human action.  
 
Explanation, of course, is but one of the functions of social theory. Other functions 
include prediction of individual and collective behaviour, understanding of the 
meaning-making processes through which individuals make sense of the world, and 
self-edification, which refers to the ways in which social knowledge can help 
individuals re-conceive themselves, thus gaining a critical distance from their former 
beliefs and preferences. Besides explanation, my theory aims particularly at these last 
two functions. Such orientation towards symbolic processes and sensitivity to the 
humanist potential of social knowledge are closely related to the way I propose to 
define what a right is.  
 
A right is not individualistic and adversarial. Neither is it something a priori. Rather, a 
right is a mutual relation, an institution made of political claims involving at least two 
individuals. As in any other social institution, a right is not simply a social 
construction of omnipotent agents. To have a right socially constitutes individuals into 
citizens and, as such, enables as much as it constrains action. But a right is a special 
sort of social institution. It refers to entitlements, liberties, powers or immunities that 
have been codified in international covenants and declarations, as well as in national 
constitutions. Instead of proposing a foundational principle common to all human 
rights struggles that empirical analyses should then try to uncover, my approach to 
rights aims at the reconstruction of the iterative processes of meaning-production and 
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institutionalization within which rights were imagined, conquered, implemented and 
sometimes denied. I thus endorse the criticism of the liberal notion that rights and 
identities are formed prior to political struggles in the public sphere.
1
 One important 
aim of a social theory of rights is thus to help explain the ways in which the social 
institution of rights came about in particular societies and historical epochs. “Rights” 
need then to be conceived of as historically contingent, whose meanings emerge and 
evolve in the context of the political struggles regarding their institutionalization.  
 
My understanding of rights includes civil, political, social and cultural rights. By 
using the term “rights” in a broad sense to include “human” as well as “citizenship” 
rights, I am departing from a long-standing tradition in sociology
2
 that subscribes to 
the liberal dichotomy of natural vs. citizenship rights. Not only is this dichotomy 
ideologically charged, and as such conveys one particular understanding of political 
modernity, but it is also increasingly anachronistic.
3
 Yet this dichotomy is still very 
much the dominant understanding in sociology departments across the world today. 
Its institutional consequences include a clear-cut division of intellectual labour 
between research on citizenship rights (nation-state based, often with a focus on 
specific policy areas) and research on human rights (cosmopolitan-oriented, usually 
concentrating in issues such as transnationalism and global justice). This is far from 
being a balanced division of labour, however. Whilst there is a significant body of 
sociological literature in citizenship, the project of a sociology of rights
4
 is still very 
much in its infancy. I wish to help correct this analytical and institutional imbalance 
by questioning the citizenship-human rights dichotomy from which it originates. 
Instead of being constrained to operate within either pole, I suggest sociology 
refocuses its attention on the category of “right” itself, thus undercutting that 
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dichotomy. This exercise of conceptual refocusing draws extensively upon a 
sociological intellectual tradition that has been systematically overlooked in this area 
of research – American philosophical pragmatism and, in particular, Mead’s original 
variety of pragmatism.  
 
Addressing the systematic neglect of Mead’s work involves overcoming the current 
narrow, “canonical” conception of the history of social thought prevalent among 
rights scholars. Of course, most rights scholars do not even show an interest in the 
contributions classical sociology might retain. Those who do, however, tend to 
associate contemporary sociology's difficulties in dealing with human rights to the 
epistemological constraints faced by sociology’s trio of founding fathers: Marx, 
Weber, and Durkheim.
5
 Bryan S. Turner, the author of arguably the most influential 
contemporary social theory of rights, is no exception. He too focuses on the post-war 
trio of founding fathers. Sociology’s reductionist view of rights stems, in his view, 
from Weber’s reduction of rights merely to claims for services or for privileges by 
social groups involved in competitive struggles, which serve as an instrument of class 
rule and expression of individualistic, possessive and egoistic society (Marx). This 
reductionist view couples with the strong Durkheimian notion of sociology’s 
separation from natural right theory (Turner 1993: 500). The alternative to classical 
sociology’s reductionism, Turner suggests, is a new sociology of rights founded upon 
four basic assumptions, which he derives from the philosophical anthropology of 
Arnold Gehlen: the vulnerability of the human body; the dependency of humans; the 
general reciprocity of social life; and the precariousness of social institutions (Turner 
2006: 23). Turner merges this “minimally foundationalist ontology” (2006: 23) with 
the social constructionist view according to which rights are “constructed in a 
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contingent and variable way according to the specific characteristics of the societies in 
which they are developed and as a particular outcome of political struggles over 
interest” (1997: 566).  
 
Turner’s strategy of reconciling foundationalism (albeit in a minimalist version) with 
constructionism in order to build a new sociology of rights, however, does not strike 
me as particularly convincing for two main reasons. First, I find Turner’s claim that 
there was “skepticism towards the idea of human and natural rights in classical 
sociology” (1993: 176) unwarranted. Classical sociology’s scepticism towards 
“natural rights theory” was not directed at rights as such, but against one specific 
understanding of rights, namely that articulated by the liberal individualist tradition. 
But rights can, and have always been, conceived differently. A case in point is G.H. 
Mead, whose social pragmatism led him to conceive of rights in radically different 
terms from the individualistic, a priori and adversarial way liberal thinking suggests. 
The suggestion here is that Mead’s conception of rights can be construed as a “buried 
treasure” (Skinner 2002: 126), a “fruit” of intellectual history available to those 
willing to “excavate” sociology’s past beyond the conventional canonical view. 
Second, it is not clear how far Turner’s foundationalism can be of help to empirical 
research on rights. Human frailty may be one argument used by historical actors when 
arguing for rights, but it is certainly not the only one and it is conceivable that it was 
not present in many processes of institutionalization of rights. Social theory and 
empirical research cannot be based upon ontological claims that ignore historical 
circumstances. Rights are political claims made by concrete actors, who, in order to 
advance their causes, mobilize available resources within specific structures of 
opportunity. As such, their “foundation” is historically contingent, varying according 
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to the multiple contexts of their institutionalization and implementation. To emphasize 
the historically contingent character of normative foundations, however, is not to 
endorse relativism. There is nothing in principle that prevents universal validity 
claims from being advanced by agents aware of their historicity.
6
 The question of the 
genesis, scope, and limits of such universal validity claims is not metaphysical, but 
sociological. It lies in the normative structure of concrete social formations and is, as 
such, amenable to social-scientific empirical research.  
 
A more promising line of inquiry, I suggest, lies in critically re-examining G.H. 
Mead’s legacy. That is the aim of the first section of this article. This section begins 
with an analysis of Mead’s theory of meaning, moves on to a brief discussion of his 
concept of object, to arrive at Mead’s approach to rights. In the second section, I 
assess the impact of Mead’s ideas in contemporary rights research. I focus on three 
strands of research: neo-pragmatism, critical theory, and legal consciousness theory. 
In the third section, I contrast the significant impact of Mead’s ideas in these three 
areas with its relative neglect within sociology, in particular the sociology of rights. 
My claim is that there are good reasons to change this situation. My solution to this 
problem is a neo-Meadian pragmatist theory of rights. Given its unique focus on the 
constitutive, fictive, and disruptive character of social action, a pragmatist theory of 
rights offers significant advantages vis-à-vis existing theories, namely symbolic 
interactionism, rational choice, functionalism, institutionalism, and practice theories. 
The article concludes with an overview of the paper’s main contributions. 
 
G.H. Mead re-examined 
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As one of the great modern process philosophies, American philosophical pragmatism 
is fundamentally non-dualistic. Dualisms such as “body versus mind” or “materialism 
versus idealism” were systematically rebutted and deconstructed by classic pragmatist 
authors including William James, John Dewey, and W.I. Thomas. One finds this anti-
Cartesian orientation throughout Mead’s system of thinking too, from his well-known 
social psychological theories to his seldom discussed epistemological and political 
writings (Silva 2008). Mead’s variety of pragmatism blended left-wing Hegelianism 
and Darwinian evolutionary theory, and, especially in the 1920s, drew from the 
“emergence philosophies” of Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead to produce 
an approach that could capture meaning-making processes without ignoring the 
physical environment within which those processes take place. To distinguish it from 
symbolic interactionism, which often dilutes itself into social constructionism (or 
“idealism”, the deficiencies of which Mead never tired of pointing out), and to 
emphasize its thoroughly intersubjective character, I describe Mead’s approach as 
“social pragmatism”.7  
 
A key element of Mead’s social pragmatism is his theory of meaning.8 For Mead, 
meaning is neither a subjective phenomenon lodged in the individual mind, nor 
something external to it. Instead, meaning emerges and develops between social 
organisms through gestural interaction. Mead explains the intersubjective emergence 
of meaning with a “three-fold” logical structure. This includes 1) the gesture of one 
individual (“organism”, in Mead’s terminology); 2) the responding gesture of the 
second organism; and 3) the “resultant” of the social act. The response of the second 
organism to the gesture of the first organism is the interpretation of that gesture – this 
response brings out the meaning (Mead [1934] 1967: 80). Meaning is thus implicit in 
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the structure of the social act and can be studied by analyzing patterns of action 
resulting from social interaction.
9
  
 
The value of this “three-fold” theory of meaning for the sociology of rights is readily 
apparent. Liberal political theory conceives of the meaning of rights as an a priori 
reality to be discovered through reason. Within social theory, the meaning of rights is 
typically conceived of either as an outcome of concrete interest-motivated political 
struggles oriented to protect vulnerable bodies (e.g. Turner 1997), or as an effect of a 
political actor’s discursive performances (e.g. Zivi 2011). If we are to follow Mead, 
however, meaning is neither external to social actors, nor is it a mere social 
construction. Instead, it is objectively located in patterns of social interaction. Mead’s 
theory of meaning is not limited to social interaction (i.e. between selves), however. If 
it was, as a symbolic interactionist reading of Mead would assume, its exclusive focus 
would be on communicative action at the expense of instrumental action. Mead, 
however, refuses to privilege one type of experience over another. Instead, his aim is 
to undercut the social/communicative versus physical/instrumental dichotomy by 
including the creation of meaning between selves and all “social objects” that 
compose their environments. “Social objects” include whatever has a common 
meaning to the participants in the social act, from physical objects, to oneself and 
other selves, to scientific, religious, or political objects. Crucially, Mead conceives of 
the process of meaning creation between individuals and social objects as being 
dialectically generative. From the continuous tension between individuals and objects 
there is the constant emergence of new individuals as well as new objects (Mead 2011: 
38). Mead illustrates his claims with the societal shift toward modernity (2011: 40-
41). Modern individuals have emerged as new scientific, political and social objects 
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gradually came into being – chief among these new political objects were modern 
individual rights.  
 
Rights are conceived by Mead as part and parcel of political modernity, and 
specifically, as a constitutive part of the normative structure of modern political 
communities.
10
 Understood as “social objects”, rights are both an aspiration and a 
defining feature of processes of political modernization. As such, rights help 
constitute individuals into modern citizens. Mead’s great achievement has been to 
render this idea, which could have remained a political philosophical insight, into a 
post-metaphysical working hypothesis. Testing this hypothesis involves as much 
solving a scientific problem, involving epistemology, social psychology, and political 
science, as it requires solving an ethical-practical problem, which requires a 
democratic political solution. To seek a combined solution to these problems is as 
urgent today as it was in Mead’s time.  
 
Today’s sociological empirical research and theoretical reflection on rights has much 
to gain from Mead’s thinking for it fundamentally destabilizes current dichotomies 
and assumptions, including the idea that human rights are essentially different from 
citizenship rights or the belief that sociology can only study human rights if it 
conceives of them as resting upon some sort of (metaphysical) foundation. 
Destabilizing these mistaken yet pervasive ways of thinking, however, is easier said 
than done. I suggest that completing the genealogical exercise of retrieving from 
collective oblivion one of sociology’s “lost treasures”, Mead’s approach to rights, is a 
crucial first step in that direction. 
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At the heart of Mead’s approach to rights is the idea that to claim a right is also to 
attribute it to others: “the individual in asserting his own right is also asserting that of 
all other members of the community” (2011: 228). Behind this claim is Mead’s notion 
of social institution. To better appreciate Mead’s concept of social institution one 
needs to realize that in his view there are two poles for the general process of social 
differentiation. One pole is constituted by social impulses, which Mead conceives of 
as the physiological basis upon which social interactions take place. The other pole is 
constituted “by the responses of individuals to the identical responses of others, that 
is, to class or social responses” (Mead [1967] 1934: 229). For Mead, these socially 
common responses are the defining component of the institutional pole of the process 
of social differentiation. In this sense, to see rights as social institutions is to conceive 
of them, contrary to natural rights theory, not as a priori attributes of individuals nor 
as pre-social entities, but as a mutual relation involving a triadic relation between an 
entitlement, the obligation to respect it, and the attitude of the “generalized other”.11  
 
There are two implications I would like to emphasize regarding Mead’s concept of 
social institution. The first implication is that social institutions do not necessarily 
oppress, nor do they exist in opposition to, individual agents. On the contrary, like 
rights, social institutions, can be “flexible and progressive, fostering individuality 
rather than discouraging it”. More important than the oppressive or progressive 
character of institutions, however, is the fact that “without social institutions of some 
sort (…) there could be no fully mature individual selves or personalities at all” 
(Mead [1967] 1934: 262). Mead’s important insight that social institutions can both 
constrain and enable one’s assertion of one’s own distinctiveness, distinct from the 
conception of social institution of 1980s theories of practice as both structured and 
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structuring, given the evolutionary and emergent character of Mead’s conception,12 
takes us directly to my second observation. I refer to the centrality of the concept of 
the “generalized other” in Mead’s thinking generally and, in particular, in his 
approach to rights.  
 
The attitude of the “generalized other” is Mead’s post-metaphysical rendering of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s general will.13 Through this concept Mead wishes to convey the 
idea of an internalized set of social attitudes, namely the principles and rules in the 
light of which individuals coordinate their own behaviour and interpret one another. It 
has been widely noted that this is a central notion of Mead’s social psychology, on a 
par with his highly influential conception of the structure of the self – the phases or 
perspectives of the “I” and the “me”. What has been less appreciated is the importance 
of the generalized other with regard to rights. Yet a substantial part of the appeal of 
Mead’s approach to rights resides exactly here. First, Mead’s generalized other 
enables one to appreciate the extent to which rights are a common attitude shared by 
members of a political community. Mead’s point is straightforward. Any given 
society’s “generalized other” encompasses common attitudes, i.e. what we would 
today call “social norms”. Rules are one kind of social norm. Very much like the rules 
of a game, social norms help define the institutional framework upon which social 
cooperation is possible, rights-norms among them. As such, rights are an objective 
component of the normative structure of modern societies. Second, the internalization 
of the attitude of the generalized other is to have a general attitude towards all 
members of the community, including oneself. Mead’s point is that rights are as much 
a part of the normative structure of a society as they are a part of the political identity 
of each individual citizen. But Mead has a very specific understanding of what this 
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entails. To have a right is not the same as having a physical object, something that can 
be accumulated, measured, quantified. As a social object, to have a right is to enter a 
political relation, to belong to a community whose norms include that right as 
something anybody can assert and that everybody can recognize.
14
 Mead sees the 
social relationships rights refer to as intrinsically reflexive. They require every 
member of the political community to take both roles or positions involved in a rights 
relation, that of entitlement and that of the obligation to respect it – this is how rights 
help constitute individual political identities. Third, for Mead, to conceive of rights as 
relational and reflexive is also to assert their contested nature. The contested nature of 
rights stems from the tension within the social self between the “I” and the “me”, the 
former being a source of unpredictable creativity, the latter ensuring the 
internalization of social conventions through the attitude of the generalized other. The 
dialectical nature of the relation between the two phases of the self means that social 
norms, rights-norms included, are being continuously internalized and reproduced 
(through the “me”) while being contested and questioned (through the “I”). For Mead, 
then, rights are contested not only within oneself (i.e., one’s legal consciousness is a 
dialectical process, responsive to concrete action-problems in real world situations, 
and which potentially evolves over time in contradictory ways), but between different 
selves as well (politicians, judges, and ordinary citizens, for example, often disagree 
about the interpretation and application of rights).
15
 In this sense, to affirm the 
contested nature of rights is to affirm the political nature of the processes of identity-
formation that sustain the claim to rights. Socialization is as much about social 
reproduction as it is about social transformation. The “I” is constantly questioning the 
norms integrated by the self via the “me” and does this by appealing to an ideal future 
community. 
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Contested, reflexive, relational; this is how Mead conceives of rights, whose meaning 
lies in concrete patterns of political interaction, whose institutionalization is as much a 
symbolic as it is a material process – bills of rights, constitutions, and the state derive 
much of their power and legitimacy from their fictional character, a power that, for 
that very reason, often makes itself felt all too tangibly in peoples’ lives.  
 
Mead’s impact discussed 
 
The heuristic value of these insights did not pass unnoticed for many in the social 
sciences and the humanities throughout the twentieth century, both in the United 
States and elsewhere. Like philosophical pragmatism as a whole, Mead’s social theory 
was often appropriated, interpreted and used as a powerful conceptual tool with which 
to subvert and criticize dominant models.
16
 In sociology, Herbert Blumer’s symbolic 
interactionism, envisaged to a large extent as an alternative to Talcott Parsons’s 
structural-functionalism, is the most glaring example of this sort of strategy of 
appropriation. Yet the symbolic interactionist reading of Mead has not been without 
consequences. In particular, it has been partly responsible for a narrow understanding 
of the extent of Mead’s contributions to contemporary sociology, focused almost 
exclusively on his social theory of the self. If in sociology Mead’s ideas have for most 
of the twentieth century been confined to symbolic interactionist circles, or within the 
interpretive scope suggested by them, the same cannot be said of other disciplinary 
domains. In this section, I discuss three examples of productive encounters with 
Mead’s work that, while acknowledging Mead’s social theory of the self, have tried to 
  
14 
go beyond it and explore his approach to rights - neo-pragmatist social theory, critical 
theory, and legal consciousness theory.  
 
Neo-pragmatist social theory is the most recent attempt to make use of pragmatist 
philosophical insights to promote social and political empirical research and 
theoretical innovation. Past attempts include, besides symbolic interactionism, the 
work of authors such as C. Wright Mills (1966) or Dmitri Shalin (1986). Neo-
pragmatist social theory distinguishes itself from these earlier appropriations by either 
drawing upon Richard Rorty’s (and to a lesser extent, Hilary Putnam’s) philosophical 
insights (e.g. Festenstein 1997), by resting upon historically minded strategies of 
theory-building (e.g., Joas [1980] 1985, [1992] 1996), as well as by distinguishing 
itself vis-à-vis alternative contemporary approaches, including post-structuralism or 
the theories of practice as developed for instance by Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. Gross 
2009).
17
 It is from these last two strategies that one should expect a more fruitful 
encounter with Mead’s approach to rights as they either explicitly deal with the 
classical pragmatist legacy, which includes it, or they are more directly concerned 
with providing conceptual tools to empirical research (also because Rorty never 
addressed Mead in systematic fashion). Surprisingly, however, there has been 
relatively little use of Mead’s ideas in neo-pragmatist research on human rights. 
Consider, for instance, Hans Joas’s genealogy of human rights (2005, 2011), David 
Hiley’s approach to human rights (2011), or Martijn Konings’ analysis of modern 
political institutions (2010) Joas's neo-pragmatist take on the origins of rights focuses 
more on Nietzsche and Weber than it does on Mead. Hiley’s Rortian approach ignores 
Mead altogether. Only Konings addresses Mead’s work alongside other pragmatist 
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classics, namely Dewey, and even though Konings’ approach is laudable on various 
counts, it does not refer to the specific case of the institution of rights per se.  
 
This relative absence of appreciation of Mead’s contributions to the problematic of 
rights among neo-pragmatists, the group of social theorists who have explored Mead 
the most beyond the conventional symbolic interactionist reading,
18
 raises an obvious 
question. Are neo-pragmatists missing something important, or is Mead’s thinking of 
little value to contemporary rights research? In order to show why I think the former 
is true, allow me to turn to the reception of Mead’s ideas by Axel Honneth, the current 
leader of the so-called Frankfurt School whose project is to develop a normative 
social theory that recovers and updates the original project of critical theory.
19
 
 
Honneth’s project of constructing a renewed critical theory of society unfolded in two 
successive stages. The first stage, published as The Critique of Power in 1985, is 
negative in nature. It consists of an historical reconstruction of the perceived aporias 
of the contributions of two key critical modern theorists, Michel Foucault and Jürgen 
Habermas. This negative-reconstructive journey took Honneth seven years later to a 
second, positive and programmatic stage of his project in The Struggle for 
Recognition (1992). This major constructive work proposes an original model for an 
ethics of recognition. The central figures of this second stage are G.W.F. Hegel and 
G.H. Mead. While Hegel provides Honneth with the basic blueprint of the process of 
ethical formation of the human species, as consisting in specific forms of reciprocal 
recognition (love, law, and ethical life), Mead’s notion of the “generalized other” is 
said to “represent not only a theoretical amendment but also a substantive deepening” 
of Hegel’s second form of recognition, legal recognition (Honneth 1995: 80). I take 
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this to be an important indication of the relative heuristic value of Mead’s approach to 
rights. Indeed, of all possible contributions by Mead, it is this all too often ignored 
dimension of his work that takes central stage in The Struggle for Recognition, a book 
that has provided Honneth with the basis of his intervention alongside Nancy Fraser 
and a host of other critically oriented thinkers in the so-called “recognition vs. 
redistribution” debate, a central controversy on matters of social justice in the global 
era.
20
  
 
Honneth’s intervention in this debate can be construed as a systematic exploration of 
Mead’s insight that recognition is an indispensable condition for personal and group 
self-realization.
21
 Pace Fraser’s dualistic model according to which social rights 
claims are be conceived as primarily economic claims (i.e. fundamentally as a 
redistribution issue), for Honneth, social rights claims are not confined to the material 
sphere of redistribution. Rather, distributive issues are to be subsumed within claims 
to recognition. Honneth designates this position as a “normative” or “moral-
theoretical monism” of recognition (2003: 3, 157). It consists of a tripartite conception 
of justice, involving three spheres of recognition – love, law, and achievement – 
within which self-consciousness about the legitimacy of one’s needs, the right to 
equal legal autonomy, and the possession of valuable talents is formed. From this 
perspective, questions of distribution can be evaluated via the principles of legal 
equality and social achievement insofar as distribution-as-recognition takes the form 
of calls for the “application of social rights that guarantee every member of society a 
minimum of essential goods regardless of achievement” (2003: 152). Honneth’s neo-
Meadian argument is that the organization of economic life is already bound up with 
moral claims about rights and entitlements. Hence public provisions of welfare such 
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as unemployment benefits, housing subsidies, pensions, and the like exist (also and 
fundamentally) as forms of recognition. Redistributive claims, as moral claims 
involving questions of justice or injustice, irredeemably have the character of 
recognition claims.  
 
Honneth’s original way of conceiving of rights claims as recognition claims has 
attracted a number of important criticisms over the years, from those suggesting the 
politics of recognition should be replaced by a “politics of acknowledgement” 
(Markell 2003: 38), to those concerned with its Eurocentric character, to those who 
accuse him of “ethical sectarianism”.22 From the point of view of the argument I 
develop in this paper, however, I cannot simply enlarge this list of criticisms for there 
are positive contributions to be found in Honneth’s work. The most obvious example 
is perhaps his willingness to avoid a foundationalist strategy. There are problems, 
however, with Honneth’s proposals. The main problem is its relative sociological 
deficit. This flaw, I claim, is directly related to Honneth’s limited and partial 
appropriation of Mead’s legacy. Many would read this as a plea to increase the 
interpretive-hermeneutic orientation of Honneth’s model, but the sociological deficit I 
have in mind is quite different. It refers to a relative lack of consideration of the 
institutional framework within which recognition claims are made, which in no way 
precludes sensitivity to the meanings agents attribute to their actions. One way to 
compensate this sociological deficit involves exploring the full sociological potential 
of Mead’s social pragmatism. Such a move, however, presupposes going beyond the 
symbolic interactionist reading that has dominated the reception of Mead’s ideas for 
most of the twentieth century and to which Honneth, too, fell prey. Curiously enough, 
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this involves looking beyond sociology and into the dominant trend in socio-legal 
studies in the United States today, the so-called “legal consciousness” perspective.23  
 
It is ironic that the most fruitful neo-Meadian empirical research programme on rights 
has been developed not in sociology but in law. Whereas the sociology of rights has 
been developed mostly around the post-war trio Marx/Weber/Durkheim, thus ignoring 
Mead’s contributions, one of the earliest articulations of what would later be termed 
the “constitutive theory of law and politics” (Ewick and Sarat 2004: 439) is Murray 
Edelman’s 1964 The Symbolic Uses of Politics, in which Mead figures as a central 
intellectual source.
24
 Edelman’s ideas proved immensely influential. They exerted a 
significant influence on Stuart Scheingold, whose work differs from Edelman for its 
focus on rights, both as a myth and as a resource. Yet Scheingold shares with Edelman 
the neo-Meadian emphasis on the symbolic nature of politics. Consider, for instance, 
the opening sentence of Scheingold’s landmark study The Politics of Rights (1974): 
“This is a book about the law. The law is real, but it is also a figment of our 
imaginations” ([1974] 2007: 3). From this pragmatist insight that the reality of law is 
to be found as much in legal institutions as in social attitudes toward them, 
Scheingold develops a sophisticated critique of the idea according to which legal 
rights are directly empowering – the so-called “myth of rights”. Yet Scheingold 
resisted making the facile opposite argument, according to which if rights are a myth 
then they are not worthy of social scientific analysis. Taking civil rights as a case in 
point, Scheingold argues that what is not available directly through rights may be 
available indirectly. The American belief in rights – i.e. the myth of rights – is itself 
available as a significant political resource, which can be deployed indirectly through 
the political process whenever legal channels are not available. In a significant 
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parallel with Honneth’s ethics of recognition, Scheingold writes: “More concretely, I 
argued that indignation generated by television reports of “massive resistance” to the 
civil rights decisions of the US Supreme Court fueled a civil rights movement” 
([1974] 2007: xix). Uniting these otherwise independent projects on rights as 
powerful symbolic political resources, from which concrete experiences of 
indignation can draw so as to criticize and transcend the existing social and political 
order, one finds a common source – Mead’s conception of rights.  
 
Edelman and Scheingold, however, were only among the first to explore Mead’s 
approach to rights empirically. The legal consciousness or constitutive perspective (I 
use these terms interchangeably) which they inaugurated has meanwhile become the 
main alternative to instrumentalist views of law, itself differentiated among various 
strands.
25
 A major contribution of the constitutive perspective, one that addresses the 
sociological deficit of proposals such as Honneth’s, is its conception of legal 
institution. Joining the “neo-institutionalist” wave that has swept the social sciences in 
the 1980s and early-1990s,
26
 the constitutive theory of law set itself the task of 
reformulating the traditional concept of legal institution. The result has been a radical 
expansion of what counts as law, or legal. A good illustration of this expanded 
conception of legal institutions is the work by Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey on 
patterns of legal consciousness (Ewick and Silbey 1998). Legal consciousness is 
participation in the process of constructing “legality”, the wide range of “meanings, 
sources of authority, and cultural practices that are commonly recognized as legal, 
regardless of who employs them or for what ends” (1998: 22), and that operates both 
as an interpretive framework and a set of resources. As such, legal consciousness “is 
produced and revealed in what people do as well as what they say” (1998: 46). In 
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their empirical work, Ewick and Silbey find three different forms of legal 
consciousness among their respondents, each invoking a particular set of cultural 
schemas and resources that enable individuals to position themselves vis-à-vis the 
law. Some individuals conceive of their relationships with the law as something 
before which they stand, with which they engage, and against which they struggle. A 
crucial component of all these different forms of legal consciousness is rights 
consciousness, i.e. the ways in which people act towards and think about rights. 
Rights emerge from this line of work as discursive resources with multiple and 
varying meanings, as well as institutional resources. They are defined as “practices”, a 
concept that captures cultural representations and brings in social relations.  
 
This understanding of rights-as-practices shows not only the impact of the social 
theories of Giddens and Bourdieu and especially of William Sewell’s version of 
practice theory upon the constitutive approach to law, but its limitations as well.
27
 One 
major problem of this relationship refers to the issue of institutional origins, i.e. how 
to explain the historical emergence of the institution of rights. The main strength of 
social theories of practice lies in analyzing the reproduction of existing structures or 
institutions, in which they constitute an obvious advance vis-à-vis approaches such as 
Honneth’s. Yet if one is interested in studying the origins or causes of institutional 
arrangements, practice theory is more limited than alternative approaches such as 
functionalism or rational choice theory, despite their own well-known limitations.
28
 
Moreover, such alternatives rest upon incompatible “theoretical presuppositions” from 
those upon which the (constructionist, interpretive) legal consciousness studies are 
founded, which renders them hopelessly inadequate. The alternative envisaged here, 
which destabilizes and moves beyond conventional understandings of the history of 
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sociology of law,
29
 is to look for the theoretical solution to this problem in the history 
of the legal consciousness perspective. Among the various fruits of this sort of 
historical exercise, the social pragmatism of G.H. Mead seems to be the most 
promising. Mead’s social evolutionary orientation to the issues of emergence, 
creativity, and novelty goes hand-in-hand with its hermeneutic sensitivity. Mead, 
however, cannot “do our thinking for ourselves” (Skinner 1969: 52), in the sense of 
providing us with a social theory of rights relevant to our time and circumstances. 
That is what I propose to do next.  
 
How to study rights: A neo-pragmatist proposal 
 
By definition, a neo-Meadian theory of rights is not Mead’s theory but a latter day 
exercise. There are two reasons why this exercise in theory construction is justified. 
The first is that Mead did not himself formulate a consistent “theory of rights” as 
such.
30
 The second reason is that, even if this is the case, Mead’s work nonetheless 
contains the necessary conceptual elements to formulate such a theory. An initial 
indication that this is true has already been provided in the last section, in the form of 
several productive encounters with Mead. Now I go a step further and show how I 
believe a neo-pragmatist theory, particularly a neo-Meadian one, can help sociologists 
studying the origins, consequences, meaning, and denial of rights.  
 
This exercise in theory building is founded upon a historical reconstruction of Mead’s 
thinking that questions the conventional symbolic interactionist interpretation to 
suggest that his contributions extend well beyond his social theory of the self. In 
particular, it is suggested that Mead’s social psychological writings are but one of the 
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three pillars that form his intellectual edifice, alongside epistemology and democratic 
politics. As a result, criticisms of Mead accusing him of not addressing systematically 
the processes of “material reproduction of societies” (as opposed to the “symbolic 
reproduction of societies”), which include processes of warfare, economic 
development, or state building, are shown to miss the mark.
31
 The case of rights is 
exemplary. Mead’s seminal contribution to the study of rights consists not merely in 
emphasizing the symbolic dimension of politics (as Edelman and his followers have 
long noticed), but in undercutting the very “idealism versus materialism” dichotomy. 
Mead has called our attention time and again to the fact that a considerable part of the 
material power of institutions such as rights resides in their symbolic character. From 
a pragmatist viewpoint, one needs to appreciate not only the constraining and 
reproductive effects of institutions over human agency but also their distinctively 
enabling qualities.
32
 To better explore this particular Meadian contribution to the 
study of rights, however, one needs to supplement his theory of meaning and 
symbolization with a more nuanced appreciation of the generative character of 
fictions.  
 
Fictions tend to be looked at with discomfort by sociologists, a discomfort that in the 
case of rights can be traced back to Jeremy Bentham’s liberal utilitarian scepticism as 
well as to the materialism of Karl Marx. One way of overcoming this discomfort 
involves turning to Thomas Hobbes’s fictional theory of the state.33 Recent research 
suggests that Hobbes has a far more transversal understanding of the nature and 
implications of representation than previously thought.
34
 For Hobbes, representation 
is a multivalent phenomenon that expresses itself in different ways in different 
domains of action, without losing its distinctive inner logic and properties. Political 
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representation, from this perspective, emerges as the political-juridical expression of a 
more general phenomenon with ramifications for the realms of theatre and theology.
35
 
The state, from this perspective, is a legal fiction with no existence except through its 
being represented. Its origins lie in a metaphorical covenant of representation. The 
“Leviathan is at once the cause and the effect of its foundation: it must be first 
imag(in)ed, so that it is brought into being” (Vieira 2008: 177).  
 
There is a striking contrast between this conception of the state as a fiction and 
Bourdieu’s influential sociology of the state. For Bourdieu, some three centuries ago, 
a specific group of social agents that he designates the “state nobility”,36 “were led to 
produce a discourse of state which, by providing justifications for their own positions, 
constituted the state – this fictio juris which slowly stopped being a mere fiction of 
jurists to become an autonomous order capable of imposing ever more widely the 
submission to its functions and its functioning and the recognition of its principles” 
(1994: 16). For Bourdieu, then, as for most sociologists,
37
 the state first emerges as a 
legal fiction only to gain effective existence as an autonomous, non-fictional order. 
For Hobbes, at least in the Vieira-Skinner reading, the state not only emerges as a 
fiction but can only subsist over time as “the Greatest of humane Powers”. These 
different understandings bear important implications for empirical research. 
According to Bourdieu, research is to be conducted on the constraints of the state over 
social agents to the level of the most profound corporeal dispositions, both at the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic level (1994: 13-14).
38
 By superseding the dichotomy 
separating processes of “symbolic versus material” social reproduction, the fictional 
theory of the state, very much like pragmatism, suggests that research should adopt an 
integrated view of both the reproductive and constraining effects as well as the 
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enabling qualities of fictions. It is not that the state, the law, and rights should be 
studied despite being fictions, as if they are real; rather, they are real because they are 
fictions, and they should matter for sociologists exactly because it is only by 
acknowledging their fictive character that one can hope to grasp their actual power.  
 
The fictive, mythical character of rights assumes particular importance when one 
wishes to address their origins. Current dominant approaches to rights formation 
explore the motivational impact of interests,
39
 the effect of structural factors,
40
 and the 
causal power of the moral qualities of rights.
41
 I see all these considerations as 
integral to a social scientific inquiry into the origins of rights provided they are re-
conceived from the point of view of their constraining, reproductive, and enabling 
impact on human action. More than estimates of the impact of these external forces 
acting on the back of agents, sociology should provide explanations of how and why 
actors are able to make legitimate claims to rights they do not yet possess. Imagining 
rights-to-be is a collective socio-legal practice of world-making (rights-bearing 
individuals are never a datum, always a constructum), a process that is only reinforced 
when these are institutionalized. Rights institutionalization is of central importance to 
a neo-pragmatist analysis of rights as the idea or belief in human rights is radically 
expanded when codified. As social objects, rights gain added meaning when 
translated into printing. Hence the singularly powerful symbolism for political 
communities that written documents such as the Universal Declarations of Rights, 
Bills of Rights, and national constitutions command.
42
 The identification of the 
mechanisms through which rights were institutionalized and the strategies mobilized 
by actors with that end in view are best reconstituted through legal or constitutional 
ethnographies (Scheppele 2004). 
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Constitutional ethnographies, as legal consciousness studies have shown, are as 
important to the study of rights institutionalization as is the analysis of ways in which 
rights constitute individuals into right-bearing citizens. Yet there are no good reasons 
why the analysis of the consequences of rights institutionalization, a process closely 
associated with state-building, is to be limited to informal settings. On the contrary, 
from a neo-pragmatist perspective, rights are to be studied both as figments of 
people’s imaginations outside formal arenas such as courts and legislatures, as well as 
inside them.
43
 Likewise, legal ethnographies such as Silbey and Ewick’s 
aforementioned study of NJ residents’s forms of legal consciousness can be 
supplemented by deliberative focus groups, and even by national and cross-national 
surveys. What all these methodologies need to share is a common orientation towards 
the reconstruction of the processes through which rights constrain and/or empower 
individual citizens and social groups.  
 
These are also the processes within which the meaning of rights is formed. From a 
neo-pragmatist perspective, this is a key question that the nascent sociology of rights 
needs to address. By conceiving the meaning of rights as intrinsically contested and 
socially constituted (as opposed to fixed and stable), I see the sociological study of its 
origins and effects as an inquiry into collective mobilization. In particular, it should 
focus on the legal and non-legal spaces in which the meaning of rights is produced 
and fought over, the strategies and resources employed by actors in these meaning-
making practices, as well as the constraining and enabling effects exerted by 
institutions and structural conditions. In this regard the most obvious predecessor is 
legal consciousness literature. The examination of the ways in which feminism, civil 
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rights, and pay equity activists have made use of legal indeterminacy “to construct 
expansively egalitarian readings of rights” is particularly consonant with the kind of 
approach advocated here (Scheingold [1974] 2007: xxviii).  
 
Yet as political actors are able to (partly) constitute the rights they enjoy, they are also 
always faced with the possibility of being deprived of them. Far from being a 
progressive expansionary tale, the history of human rights is as much a history of 
creation and implementation as it is a history of retrenchment and denial.  From a neo-
pragmatist point of view, sociologists should focus more on how the relational and 
reflexive character of rights is affected by political processes of rights retrenchment 
and, especially, rights violations as these entail profound consequences for citizen 
identity. A similar point, of course, has already been made by Honneth, who suggests 
that the “denial of rights” can be conceived of as a type of “social pathology” 
amenable to empirical analysis through “group discussions” and “deep interviews”, 
on the premise that these have a “consciousness-raising effect” (interviewed in 
Petersen and Willig 2002: 268-269). Perhaps even more interesting is the growing 
literature on cultural trauma (see e.g. Alexander et al. 2004), whose strong 
constructivist bent is very much in line with neo-Meadian sociology. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are three main contributions I wish to make in this paper. The first contribution 
is to place G.H. Mead among the precursors of the modern day sociology of rights. 
This involved reconstructing Mead’s (admittedly sketchy) approach to rights as a 
coherent social theory of rights. This was only possible due to the combination of a 
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historical reconstruction of Mead’s thinking, in which several aspects of his work 
were brought together to build a systematic account of rights, and theory-building. 
This second task involved a critical review of the appropriations of Mead’s work on 
rights, including socio-legal studies. The paper’s second major contribution has been 
to shed more light on this little known historical episode of intellectual diffusion. The 
third, more general, contribution of the paper has been to show how productive an 
encounter between American philosophical pragmatism and contemporary social 
sciences can be. In particular, I have tried to show the extent to which sociological 
empirical research on the origins, meaning, implementation and denial of rights can 
benefit from a neo-Meadian approach. 
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 See, e.g. Engel and Munger (2003). This postliberal approach treats rights not as 
empirical entities that are found in presocial nature, but as political and social 
creations with the causal powers to constitute personhood and identity.  
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2
 E.g.Turner (1993). Exceptions include: e.g. Somers and Roberts (2008).  
3
 Even among scholars of constitutional law, there is a growing tendency to equate 
both kinds of rights protection regimes. See, e.g., Tushnet (1992).  
4
 Contemporary examples of sociology of rights include Sjoberg, Gill and Williams 
(2001), Woodiwiss (2005), Turner (1993, 2006).  
5
 Examples abound: Scheppele (1994: 384); Connell (1995: 26); Somers and Roberts 
(2008: 396-7). 
6
 A similar point has been made by Joas ([1997] 2000, 2005). 
7
 I am not alone in making this choice. Gary A. Cook, for instance, uses this same 
designation to refer to Mead’s approach (1993: 161 ff.).  
8
 Primary sources on Mead’s theory of meaning include several journal articles (2011: 
15-20; 47-52; 53-57; see also Mead 1910). Secondary sources include, e.g., Joas 
([1980] 1985: 98-106), Cook (1993: 48-66), Silva (2007: 28-42). 
9
 Symbolic interactionists have long explored the macro-sociological implications of 
Mead’s approach. The intersection of these meanings, expressed through the 
negotiation of lines of action, is what constitutes a community (e.g. Blumer 1969). 
10
 Primary sources on Mead’s theory of rights include 2011: 221-232; 264-279; 
310-323. Secondary sources include, e.g., Betz 1974; Singer 1999: 128-141; Silva 
2008: 193-198. 
11
 See Singer (1999: 27). 
12
 As exemplars of social theories of practice, see, e.g., Bourdieu [1980] (1990), and 
Sewell (1992).  
13
 Mead discussed Rousseau’s concept of “general will” on various occasions, both in 
journal articles and in lecture notes. See, e.g., Mead (2011: 225; 1936: 13). 
The political theorist Iris Marion Young expressed this same idea when she wrote: 
“Rights are relationships, not things; (…) Rights refer to doing more than having; to 
social relationships that enable or constrain action” (1990: 25).  
15
This insight is the starting point of the so-called “political” (as opposed to “legal”) 
approaches to rights and constitutionalism in political theory. See e.g. Pettit (1997), 
and especially Bellamy (2007: 16).  
16
 On the potential for social criticism of American philosophical pragmatism, see e.g. 
Habermas ([1981] 1986). 
17
 See e.g. Dunn (1997).  
18
 See e.g. Joas ([1992] 1996).  
19
 See Shalin (1992).  
20
 See e.g. Fraser (1997). On the debate between Fraser and Honneth, see Fraser and 
Honneth (2003).  
21
 In rigor, Honneth’s research project begins with the historical work on the workers 
movement by E.P. Thompson and Barrington Moore. See Honneth 1995: 166-167; 
2003: 131.  
22
 For a criticism of its “ethical sectarianism”, see Fraser 2003: 228. 
23
 Exemplars include Merry (1990), Sarat (1990). A different yet related perspective is 
the constitutive theory of law: see e.g. Thompson (1978), Habermas ([1992] 1996). 
Another related strand of literature studies rights as political resources for progressive 
social mobilization. In this case, see e.g. Silverstein (1996). 
24
 See Edelman 1964: 26, 34-35, 49-51; see also 1971: 53-57; 1988: 96-97.  
25
 See Brigham (1996). On legal consciousness research conducted by sociologists see 
e.g. Larson (2004). 
26
 See e.g. DiMaggio and Powell (1991). 
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27
 On Sewell’s influence, see Ewick and Silbey (1998: 40 ff).  
28
 See Pierson (2000). For a critique of the difficulties of providing causal accounts of 
social institutions associated with practice theory, see Chapter 2 of Turner (1994). 
29
 See e.g. Deflem (2008: 132-135). 
30
 That is why in this paper I speak not of Mead’s “theory of rights”, but of Mead’s 
“approach to rights.” For a similar understanding, see Cook (1993: 209). 
31
 See, e.g., Silva (2008). For a criticism of Mead as an “idealist”, see the second 
volume of Habermas ([1981] 1986). 
32
 See Silva 2007: 62-63; Konings (2010: 64). 
33
 On Hobbes’s fictional theory of the state, see, e.g., Vieira (2008) and Skinner 
(2010).  
34
 See e.g. Pitkin (1967). 
35
 Vieira (2008: 146). 
36
 See Bourdieu ([1989] 1998: 371-389). 
37
 See Abrams (1988). 
38
 On the law’s power to create new social groups, identities, and subjectivity, see 
Bourdieu ([1986] 1987: 838). 
39
 See Tilly (1998: 56).  
40
 E.g. poverty and unemployment; ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages; and 
political regime types.  
41
 See McCann (2006: 30). See also Turner (2006). 
42
 On the importance of the written word in modern conditions, see Luhmann (1992). 
On the symbolic power of constitutions, see Wolin (1989). 
43
 See also Latour ([2002] 2010).  
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